Skip to content

SecurityPkg: Out of bound read in HashPeImageByType()#10928

Merged
mergify[bot] merged 4 commits into
masterfrom
security-advisory/cve-2024-38797/advisory
Apr 9, 2025
Merged

SecurityPkg: Out of bound read in HashPeImageByType()#10928
mergify[bot] merged 4 commits into
masterfrom
security-advisory/cve-2024-38797/advisory

Conversation

@Flickdm
Copy link
Copy Markdown
Contributor

@Flickdm Flickdm commented Apr 7, 2025

Description

CVE: CVE-2024-38797

In HashPeImageByType(), the hash of a PE/COFF image is calculated. This function may get untrusted input.

Inside this function, the following code verifies the loaded image has the correct format, by reading the second byte of the buffer.

  if ((*(AuthData + 1) & TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) != TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) {
  	...
  }

Since the input image is not trusted, it may not have a second byte present to read. So this poses a potential out of bounds read error.

With the below fix, we are ensuring that we don't perform an out of bound read. i.e, we make sure that AuthDataSize is greater than 1.

  if (AuthDataSize > 1 && (*(AuthData + 1) & TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) != TWO_BYTE_ENCODE){
    ...
  }

AuthDataSize size is verified before reading the second byte. So, if AuthDataSize is less than 2, the second byte will not be read, and the out of bound read will be prevented.


The logic of the function was cleaned up to provide an early exit if the untrusted data does not have enough bytes to check for a TWO_BYTE_ENCODE or if the TWO_BYTE_ENCODE is not present.

This is slightly more efficient than checking this condition in the for loop.

Additionally, when the hash algorithm selected by Index has such a large OID that the OID Comparison couldn't be performed - this would lead to an early break rather than a OID Mismatch. This has been changed to a continue instead.


  • Breaking change?
  • Impacts security?
    • Corrects out of bound read in HashPeImageByType ()
  • Includes tests?

How This Was Tested

Tested the patch on real platform with and without TPM connected and verified image is booting fine.

Integration Instructions

N/A

@github-actions github-actions Bot added the impact:security This change has a direct security impact such as changing a crypto algorithm. label Apr 7, 2025
@Flickdm Flickdm force-pushed the security-advisory/cve-2024-38797/advisory branch 3 times, most recently from bb1717f to 7ef3efe Compare April 7, 2025 20:36
Flickdm added 4 commits April 8, 2025 08:03
In HashPeImageByType(), the hash of PE/COFF image is calculated.
This function may get untrusted input.

Inside this function, the following code verifies the loaded image has
the correct format, by reading the second byte of the buffer.

```c
  if ((*(AuthData + 1) & TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) != TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) {
  	...
  }
```

The input image is not trusted and that may not have the second byte to
read. So this poses an out of bound read error.

With below fix we are assuring that we don't do out of bound read. i.e,
we make sure that AuthDataSize is greater than 1.

```c
  if (AuthDataSize > 1
      && (*(AuthData + 1) & TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) != TWO_BYTE_ENCODE){
    ...
  }
```

AuthDataSize size is verified before reading the second byte.
So if AuthDataSize is less than 2, the second byte will not be read, and
the out of bound read situation won't occur.

Tested the patch on real platform with and without TPM connected and
verified image is booting fine.

Authored-by: Raj AlwinX Selvaraj <Alw...@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick <DougFlick@microsoft.com>
Namely:

(1) The TWO_BYTE_ENCODE check is independent of Index. If it evalutes
    to TRUE for Index==0, then it will evaluate to TRUE for all other
    Index values as well. As a result, the (Index == HASHALG_MAX)
    condition will fire after the loop, and we'll return
    EFI_UNSUPPORTED.

    While this is correct, functionally speaking, it is wasteful to
    keep re-checking TWO_BYTE_ENCODE in the loop body. The check
    should be made at the top of the function, and EFI_UNSUPPORTED
    should be returned at once, if appropriate.

(2) If the hash algorithm selected by Index has such a large OID that
    the OID comparison cannot even be performed (because AuthDataSize
    is not large enough for containing the OID in question, starting
    at offset 32), then the function returns EFI_UNSUPPORTED at once.

    This is bogus; this case should simply be treated as an OID
    mismatch, and the loop should advance to the next Index value /
    hash algorithm candidate. A remaining hash algo may have a shorter
    OID and yield an OID match.

Signed-off-by: Doug Flick <DougFlick@microsoft.com>
Namely:

(1) The TWO_BYTE_ENCODE check is independent of Index. If it evalutes
    to TRUE for Index==0, then it will evaluate to TRUE for all other
    Index values as well. As a result, the (Index == HASHALG_MAX)
    condition will fire after the loop, and we'll return
    EFI_UNSUPPORTED.

    While this is correct, functionally speaking, it is wasteful to
    keep re-checking TWO_BYTE_ENCODE in the loop body. The check
    should be made at the top of the function, and EFI_UNSUPPORTED
    should be returned at once, if appropriate.

(2) If the hash algorithm selected by Index has such a large OID that
    the OID comparison cannot even be performed (because AuthDataSize
    is not large enough for containing the OID in question, starting
    at offset 32), then the function returns EFI_UNSUPPORTED at once.

    This is bogus; this case should simply be treated as an OID
    mismatch, and the loop should advance to the next Index value /
    hash algorithm candidate. A remaining hash algo may have a shorter
    OID and yield an OID match.

Signed-off-by: Doug Flick <DougFlick@microsoft.com>
This commit updates the SecurityFixes.yaml file to include
information about the CVE-2024-38797 vulnerability.

Signed-off-by: Doug Flick <DougFlick@microsoft.com>
@Flickdm Flickdm force-pushed the security-advisory/cve-2024-38797/advisory branch from 7ef3efe to 519366f Compare April 8, 2025 15:03
@makubacki makubacki added the push Auto push patch series in PR if all checks pass label Apr 9, 2025
@mergify mergify Bot merged commit d79d8d6 into master Apr 9, 2025
hongxu-jia added a commit to hongxu-jia/openembedded-core that referenced this pull request Jun 13, 2025
According to [1]:

EDK2 contains a vulnerability in the HashPeImageByType(). A user may cause a read out of
bounds when a corrupted data pointer and length are sent via an adjecent network.
A successful exploit of this vulnerability may lead to a loss of Integrity and/or
Availability.

Backport fixes from upstream edk2 [2][3]

[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38797
[2] GHSA-4wjw-6xmf-44xf
[3] tianocore/edk2#10928

Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
brainhoard-github pushed a commit to distro-core-curated-mirrors/poky-contrib that referenced this pull request Jun 13, 2025
According to [1]:

EDK2 contains a vulnerability in the HashPeImageByType(). A user may cause a read out of
bounds when a corrupted data pointer and length are sent via an adjecent network.
A successful exploit of this vulnerability may lead to a loss of Integrity and/or
Availability.

Backport fixes from upstream edk2 [2][3]

[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38797
[2] GHSA-4wjw-6xmf-44xf
[3] tianocore/edk2#10928

(From OE-Core rev: 3c77d61fc52eb1861ba68bfe916a71c987b9cd57)

Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Dubois-Briand <mathieu.dubois-briand@bootlin.com>
halstead pushed a commit to yoctoproject/poky that referenced this pull request Jun 13, 2025
According to [1]:

EDK2 contains a vulnerability in the HashPeImageByType(). A user may cause a read out of
bounds when a corrupted data pointer and length are sent via an adjecent network.
A successful exploit of this vulnerability may lead to a loss of Integrity and/or
Availability.

Backport fixes from upstream edk2 [2][3]

[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38797
[2] GHSA-4wjw-6xmf-44xf
[3] tianocore/edk2#10928

(From OE-Core rev: c6d1f54942abd7a231cd33221eecc5620eda59fe)

Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
halstead pushed a commit to openembedded/openembedded-core that referenced this pull request Jun 13, 2025
According to [1]:

EDK2 contains a vulnerability in the HashPeImageByType(). A user may cause a read out of
bounds when a corrupted data pointer and length are sent via an adjecent network.
A successful exploit of this vulnerability may lead to a loss of Integrity and/or
Availability.

Backport fixes from upstream edk2 [2][3]

[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38797
[2] GHSA-4wjw-6xmf-44xf
[3] tianocore/edk2#10928

Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
halstead pushed a commit to yoctoproject/poky that referenced this pull request Jun 13, 2025
According to [1]:

EDK2 contains a vulnerability in the HashPeImageByType(). A user may cause a read out of
bounds when a corrupted data pointer and length are sent via an adjecent network.
A successful exploit of this vulnerability may lead to a loss of Integrity and/or
Availability.

Backport fixes from upstream edk2 [2][3]

[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38797
[2] GHSA-4wjw-6xmf-44xf
[3] tianocore/edk2#10928

(From OE-Core rev: c809f0fa07105343d21e1975d9e03cbcd7ba0fd4)

Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
halstead pushed a commit to openembedded/openembedded-core that referenced this pull request Jun 13, 2025
According to [1]:

EDK2 contains a vulnerability in the HashPeImageByType(). A user may cause a read out of
bounds when a corrupted data pointer and length are sent via an adjecent network.
A successful exploit of this vulnerability may lead to a loss of Integrity and/or
Availability.

Backport fixes from upstream edk2 [2][3]

[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38797
[2] GHSA-4wjw-6xmf-44xf
[3] tianocore/edk2#10928

Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
halstead pushed a commit to yoctoproject/poky that referenced this pull request Jun 13, 2025
According to [1]:

EDK2 contains a vulnerability in the HashPeImageByType(). A user may cause a read out of
bounds when a corrupted data pointer and length are sent via an adjecent network.
A successful exploit of this vulnerability may lead to a loss of Integrity and/or
Availability.

Backport fixes from upstream edk2 [2][3]

[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38797
[2] GHSA-4wjw-6xmf-44xf
[3] tianocore/edk2#10928

(From OE-Core rev: fe0257e5e93e4d744484ac46df4c322017874c64)

Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
halstead pushed a commit to openembedded/openembedded-core that referenced this pull request Jun 13, 2025
According to [1]:

EDK2 contains a vulnerability in the HashPeImageByType(). A user may cause a read out of
bounds when a corrupted data pointer and length are sent via an adjecent network.
A successful exploit of this vulnerability may lead to a loss of Integrity and/or
Availability.

Backport fixes from upstream edk2 [2][3]

[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38797
[2] GHSA-4wjw-6xmf-44xf
[3] tianocore/edk2#10928

Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
brainhoard-github pushed a commit to distro-core-curated-mirrors/poky-contrib that referenced this pull request Jun 13, 2025
According to [1]:

EDK2 contains a vulnerability in the HashPeImageByType(). A user may cause a read out of
bounds when a corrupted data pointer and length are sent via an adjecent network.
A successful exploit of this vulnerability may lead to a loss of Integrity and/or
Availability.

Backport fixes from upstream edk2 [2][3]

[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38797
[2] GHSA-4wjw-6xmf-44xf
[3] tianocore/edk2#10928

(From OE-Core rev: 866fc8ba96a72d3dd18838e6d8e77acb320a48d8)

Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Dubois-Briand <mathieu.dubois-briand@bootlin.com>
halstead pushed a commit to yoctoproject/poky that referenced this pull request Jun 13, 2025
According to [1]:

EDK2 contains a vulnerability in the HashPeImageByType(). A user may cause a read out of
bounds when a corrupted data pointer and length are sent via an adjecent network.
A successful exploit of this vulnerability may lead to a loss of Integrity and/or
Availability.

Backport fixes from upstream edk2 [2][3]

[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38797
[2] GHSA-4wjw-6xmf-44xf
[3] tianocore/edk2#10928

(From OE-Core rev: fe0257e5e93e4d744484ac46df4c322017874c64)

Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
halstead pushed a commit to yoctoproject/poky that referenced this pull request Jun 13, 2025
According to [1]:

EDK2 contains a vulnerability in the HashPeImageByType(). A user may cause a read out of
bounds when a corrupted data pointer and length are sent via an adjecent network.
A successful exploit of this vulnerability may lead to a loss of Integrity and/or
Availability.

Backport fixes from upstream edk2 [2][3]

[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38797
[2] GHSA-4wjw-6xmf-44xf
[3] tianocore/edk2#10928

(From OE-Core rev: fe0257e5e93e4d744484ac46df4c322017874c64)

Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
halstead pushed a commit to yoctoproject/poky that referenced this pull request Jun 13, 2025
According to [1]:

EDK2 contains a vulnerability in the HashPeImageByType(). A user may cause a read out of
bounds when a corrupted data pointer and length are sent via an adjecent network.
A successful exploit of this vulnerability may lead to a loss of Integrity and/or
Availability.

Backport fixes from upstream edk2 [2][3]

[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38797
[2] GHSA-4wjw-6xmf-44xf
[3] tianocore/edk2#10928

(From OE-Core rev: fe0257e5e93e4d744484ac46df4c322017874c64)

Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
brainhoard-github pushed a commit to distro-core-curated-mirrors/poky-contrib that referenced this pull request Jun 14, 2025
According to [1]:

EDK2 contains a vulnerability in the HashPeImageByType(). A user may cause a read out of
bounds when a corrupted data pointer and length are sent via an adjecent network.
A successful exploit of this vulnerability may lead to a loss of Integrity and/or
Availability.

Backport fixes from upstream edk2 [2][3]

[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38797
[2] GHSA-4wjw-6xmf-44xf
[3] tianocore/edk2#10928

(From OE-Core rev: 34c7941508d2bfc3ac271bdc6d5c0d1a652c2989)

Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Dubois-Briand <mathieu.dubois-briand@bootlin.com>
brainhoard-github pushed a commit to distro-core-curated-mirrors/poky-contrib that referenced this pull request Jun 15, 2025
According to [1]:

EDK2 contains a vulnerability in the HashPeImageByType(). A user may cause a read out of
bounds when a corrupted data pointer and length are sent via an adjecent network.
A successful exploit of this vulnerability may lead to a loss of Integrity and/or
Availability.

Backport fixes from upstream edk2 [2][3]

[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38797
[2] GHSA-4wjw-6xmf-44xf
[3] tianocore/edk2#10928

(From OE-Core rev: 34c7941508d2bfc3ac271bdc6d5c0d1a652c2989)

Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Dubois-Briand <mathieu.dubois-briand@bootlin.com>
halstead pushed a commit to yoctoproject/poky that referenced this pull request Jun 15, 2025
According to [1]:

EDK2 contains a vulnerability in the HashPeImageByType(). A user may cause a read out of
bounds when a corrupted data pointer and length are sent via an adjecent network.
A successful exploit of this vulnerability may lead to a loss of Integrity and/or
Availability.

Backport fixes from upstream edk2 [2][3]

[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38797
[2] GHSA-4wjw-6xmf-44xf
[3] tianocore/edk2#10928

(From OE-Core rev: fe0257e5e93e4d744484ac46df4c322017874c64)

Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
halstead pushed a commit to yoctoproject/poky that referenced this pull request Jun 15, 2025
According to [1]:

EDK2 contains a vulnerability in the HashPeImageByType(). A user may cause a read out of
bounds when a corrupted data pointer and length are sent via an adjecent network.
A successful exploit of this vulnerability may lead to a loss of Integrity and/or
Availability.

Backport fixes from upstream edk2 [2][3]

[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38797
[2] GHSA-4wjw-6xmf-44xf
[3] tianocore/edk2#10928

(From OE-Core rev: fe0257e5e93e4d744484ac46df4c322017874c64)

Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
halstead pushed a commit to yoctoproject/poky that referenced this pull request Jun 16, 2025
According to [1]:

EDK2 contains a vulnerability in the HashPeImageByType(). A user may cause a read out of
bounds when a corrupted data pointer and length are sent via an adjecent network.
A successful exploit of this vulnerability may lead to a loss of Integrity and/or
Availability.

Backport fixes from upstream edk2 [2][3]

[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38797
[2] GHSA-4wjw-6xmf-44xf
[3] tianocore/edk2#10928

(From OE-Core rev: fe0257e5e93e4d744484ac46df4c322017874c64)

Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
halstead pushed a commit to yoctoproject/poky that referenced this pull request Jun 16, 2025
According to [1]:

EDK2 contains a vulnerability in the HashPeImageByType(). A user may cause a read out of
bounds when a corrupted data pointer and length are sent via an adjecent network.
A successful exploit of this vulnerability may lead to a loss of Integrity and/or
Availability.

Backport fixes from upstream edk2 [2][3]

[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38797
[2] GHSA-4wjw-6xmf-44xf
[3] tianocore/edk2#10928

(From OE-Core rev: fe0257e5e93e4d744484ac46df4c322017874c64)

Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
halstead pushed a commit to yoctoproject/poky that referenced this pull request Jun 16, 2025
According to [1]:

EDK2 contains a vulnerability in the HashPeImageByType(). A user may cause a read out of
bounds when a corrupted data pointer and length are sent via an adjecent network.
A successful exploit of this vulnerability may lead to a loss of Integrity and/or
Availability.

Backport fixes from upstream edk2 [2][3]

[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38797
[2] GHSA-4wjw-6xmf-44xf
[3] tianocore/edk2#10928

(From OE-Core rev: fe0257e5e93e4d744484ac46df4c322017874c64)

Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
halstead pushed a commit to yoctoproject/poky that referenced this pull request Jun 16, 2025
According to [1]:

EDK2 contains a vulnerability in the HashPeImageByType(). A user may cause a read out of
bounds when a corrupted data pointer and length are sent via an adjecent network.
A successful exploit of this vulnerability may lead to a loss of Integrity and/or
Availability.

Backport fixes from upstream edk2 [2][3]

[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38797
[2] GHSA-4wjw-6xmf-44xf
[3] tianocore/edk2#10928

(From OE-Core rev: fe0257e5e93e4d744484ac46df4c322017874c64)

Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
halstead pushed a commit to yoctoproject/poky that referenced this pull request Jun 16, 2025
According to [1]:

EDK2 contains a vulnerability in the HashPeImageByType(). A user may cause a read out of
bounds when a corrupted data pointer and length are sent via an adjecent network.
A successful exploit of this vulnerability may lead to a loss of Integrity and/or
Availability.

Backport fixes from upstream edk2 [2][3]

[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38797
[2] GHSA-4wjw-6xmf-44xf
[3] tianocore/edk2#10928

(From OE-Core rev: 12f8445ef4f0e816a8ace86ac90d58069431615a)

Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
halstead pushed a commit to openembedded/openembedded-core that referenced this pull request Jun 16, 2025
According to [1]:

EDK2 contains a vulnerability in the HashPeImageByType(). A user may cause a read out of
bounds when a corrupted data pointer and length are sent via an adjecent network.
A successful exploit of this vulnerability may lead to a loss of Integrity and/or
Availability.

Backport fixes from upstream edk2 [2][3]

[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38797
[2] GHSA-4wjw-6xmf-44xf
[3] tianocore/edk2#10928

Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
brainhoard-github pushed a commit to distro-core-curated-mirrors/poky-contrib that referenced this pull request Jun 16, 2025
According to [1]:

EDK2 contains a vulnerability in the HashPeImageByType(). A user may cause a read out of
bounds when a corrupted data pointer and length are sent via an adjecent network.
A successful exploit of this vulnerability may lead to a loss of Integrity and/or
Availability.

Backport fixes from upstream edk2 [2][3]

[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38797
[2] GHSA-4wjw-6xmf-44xf
[3] tianocore/edk2#10928

(From OE-Core rev: 34c7941508d2bfc3ac271bdc6d5c0d1a652c2989)

Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Dubois-Briand <mathieu.dubois-briand@bootlin.com>
halstead pushed a commit to yoctoproject/poky that referenced this pull request Jun 16, 2025
According to [1]:

EDK2 contains a vulnerability in the HashPeImageByType(). A user may cause a read out of
bounds when a corrupted data pointer and length are sent via an adjecent network.
A successful exploit of this vulnerability may lead to a loss of Integrity and/or
Availability.

Backport fixes from upstream edk2 [2][3]

[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38797
[2] GHSA-4wjw-6xmf-44xf
[3] tianocore/edk2#10928

(From OE-Core rev: a94550098d821e0055020a7d866648a761efcade)

Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
halstead pushed a commit to openembedded/openembedded-core that referenced this pull request Jun 16, 2025
According to [1]:

EDK2 contains a vulnerability in the HashPeImageByType(). A user may cause a read out of
bounds when a corrupted data pointer and length are sent via an adjecent network.
A successful exploit of this vulnerability may lead to a loss of Integrity and/or
Availability.

Backport fixes from upstream edk2 [2][3]

[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38797
[2] GHSA-4wjw-6xmf-44xf
[3] tianocore/edk2#10928

Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
mseaster-wr pushed a commit to WindRiverLinux24/oe-core that referenced this pull request Jul 23, 2025
According to [1]:

EDK2 contains a vulnerability in the HashPeImageByType(). A user may cause a read out of
bounds when a corrupted data pointer and length are sent via an adjecent network.
A successful exploit of this vulnerability may lead to a loss of Integrity and/or
Availability.

Backport fixes from upstream edk2 [2][3]

[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38797
[2] GHSA-4wjw-6xmf-44xf
[3] tianocore/edk2#10928

Issue: LIN1024-8438
(LOCAL REV: NOT UPSTREAM) -- Sent to oe-core on 20250613

Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
zboszor pushed a commit to zboszor/openembedded-core that referenced this pull request Dec 6, 2025
According to [1]:

EDK2 contains a vulnerability in the HashPeImageByType(). A user may cause a read out of
bounds when a corrupted data pointer and length are sent via an adjecent network.
A successful exploit of this vulnerability may lead to a loss of Integrity and/or
Availability.

Backport fixes from upstream edk2 [2][3]

[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38797
[2] GHSA-4wjw-6xmf-44xf
[3] tianocore/edk2#10928

Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment

Labels

impact:security This change has a direct security impact such as changing a crypto algorithm. push Auto push patch series in PR if all checks pass

Projects

None yet

Development

Successfully merging this pull request may close these issues.

3 participants